Portrait of Robin Liebholz

Robin Liebholz

PhD Candidate in Economics

Department of Economics, University of Cologne

About

Hi! I am Robin, a PhD Candidate and Research & Teaching Associate in the Department of Economics at the University of Cologne. My advisors are Felix Bierbrauer and Johannes Münster.

I am an applied theorist whose research is centered on how to improve and optimally design government policies. I mainly — but not exclusively — use methods from optimal tax theory and mechanism design. Besides, I am interested in positive questions on how political actors really behave and on the intersection of economics and philosophy.

Outside economics, I enjoy sports — these days surfing, football, calisthenics, yoga — the arts and philosophy.

Work in Progress

Bureaucracy and Social Transfer Systems

Summary

I construct a model of optimal need-based social transfers with costly bureaucracy. Many real-world transfer programs, such as benefits for people with disabilities, care benefits, or family assistance, aim to allocate money to agents with higher need rather than to redistribute between income groups. The state would like to individualize transfers because agents differ in their marginal utility of money, which is higher for agents with greater need. Bureaucracy makes individualized (case-by-case) transfers possible, but it is costly: for the state, because it has to screen applicants, administer individual cases, and run an increasingly complex system, and for agents, because of the reporting burden. This burden is precisely what allows the state to identify those in need. The state therefore chooses the level of bureaucracy on two margins: which agents receive a uniform transfer and which are treated individually (the extensive margin), and how much burden individually treated agents face (the intensive margin). Even when the state can observe need, it is optimal to give at least some range of agents a uniform transfer, because treating types individually is costly in itself. When need is unobservable, agents with lower need receive an information rent, and the state may impose higher burdens on agents with higher need in order to screen them. Informational constraints can make it optimal to pool agents in the individualized region, either with the uniform-transfer recipients or in additional brackets with higher transfers and higher burdens. I provide interpretable conditions for where to find these pools. For individualized and pooled transfers, I derive formulas akin to the ABC formula of optimal income taxation that separate the roles of need, the type distribution, welfare weights, and bureaucracy costs. My results offer an explanation for the complex multi-bracket structure of many real-world transfer systems.

Evaluating Tax Systems when the Labor Force Changes

Bargaining for International Public Goods: Implications for Optimal Income Taxation

Contact

I serve as representative of the academic staff on the Board of the Department of Economics at the University of Cologne. If you are academic staff at the department and have any issue in which I can support you, please hit me up.

I also organize the weekly internal Public Economics Meeting. If you want to participate, discuss your research idea, or present your research on (theoretical) public economics (or connected fields), feel free to write me a mail.

Email

firstname.lastname@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Office

Department of Economics
University of Cologne
Universitätsstr. 22a (SSC)
50923 Cologne, Germany
Office 3.225 (3rd floor)